In cryptography, a secret sharing scheme is a method for distributing a secret amongst a group of participants, each of which is allocated a share of the secret. The secret can only be reconstructed when the shares are combined together; individual shares are of no use on their own. The study of secret sharing schemes was independently initiated by Shamir[10] and Blakely[3] in 1979. Since then several other secret sharing schemes were introduced. Many of those schemes are (n,k) threshold systems. When shareholders present their shares in the secret reconstruction phase, dishonest shareholder(s) (i. e. cheater(s)) can always exclusively derive the secret by presenting faked share(s) and thus the other honest shareholders get nothing but a faked secret. Tompa and Woll[12] also suggested that Cheater detection and identification are very important to achieve fair reconstruction of a secret. Our proposed scheme uses the shares generated by the dealer to reconstruct the secret and, at the same time, to detect and identify cheaters We have included discussion on three attacks of cheaters and bounds of detectability and identifiability of our proposed scheme under these three attacks. Our proposed scheme is an extension of Shamir's secret sharing scheme.

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Secret Sharing Scheme Detection Identification attacks Consistency Majority Voting