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A Verifiable Electronic Voting System with Homomorphic Tallying using Elliptic-curve Cryptography
by
Charles F. De Barros
| International Journal of Computer Applications |
| Foundation of Computer Science (FCS), NY, USA |
| Volume 183 - Number 44 |
| Year of Publication: 2021 |
| Authors: Charles F. De Barros |
10.5120/ijca2021921848
|
Charles F. De Barros . A Verifiable Electronic Voting System with Homomorphic Tallying using Elliptic-curve Cryptography. International Journal of Computer Applications. 183, 44 ( Dec 2021), 1-8. DOI=10.5120/ijca2021921848
@article{
10.5120/ijca2021921848,
author = {
Charles F. De Barros
},
title = { A Verifiable Electronic Voting System with Homomorphic Tallying using Elliptic-curve Cryptography },
journal = {
International Journal of Computer Applications
},
issue_date = { Dec 2021 },
volume = { 183 },
number = { 44 },
month = { Dec },
year = { 2021 },
issn = { 0975-8887 },
pages = {
1-8
},
numpages = {9},
url = {
https://ijcaonline.org/archives/volume183/number44/32224-2021921848/
},
doi = { 10.5120/ijca2021921848 },
publisher = {Foundation of Computer Science (FCS), NY, USA},
address = {New York, USA}
}
%0 Journal Article
%1 2024-02-07T01:19:36.897254+05:30
%A Charles F. De Barros
%T A Verifiable Electronic Voting System with Homomorphic Tallying using Elliptic-curve Cryptography
%J International Journal of Computer Applications
%@ 0975-8887
%V 183
%N 44
%P 1-8
%D 2021
%I Foundation of Computer Science (FCS), NY, USA
Abstract
In this paper, the use of elliptic-curve cryptography (ECC) to build an end-to-end verifiable electronic voting system with homomorphic tallying is discussed. Verifiability is an important property of electronic voting systems, allowing any interested person to independently check that all votes were correctly recorded and counted. On the other hand, homomorphic tallying allows the votes to be counted without having to be individually decrypted, which reinforces ballot secrecy, another crucial security requirement for voting systems. After the encrypted votes are counted, only the final tally is decrypted in order to reveal the election result. Ballots are encrypted using elliptic-curve cryptography, which has been proven to offer high security levels, while keeping smaller key sizes, in comparison to other well known cryptographic primitives.
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Index Terms
Computer Science
Information Sciences
Keywords