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The Markov Chain Resulting from the States of the Bitcoin

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International Journal of Computer Applications
Foundation of Computer Science (FCS), NY, USA
Year of Publication: 2018
Authors:
Moustapha BA
10.5120/ijca2018917520

Moustapha BA. The Markov Chain Resulting from the States of the Bitcoin. International Journal of Computer Applications 181(4):1-7, July 2018. BibTeX

@article{10.5120/ijca2018917520,
	author = {Moustapha BA},
	title = {The Markov Chain Resulting from the States of the Bitcoin},
	journal = {International Journal of Computer Applications},
	issue_date = {July 2018},
	volume = {181},
	number = {4},
	month = {Jul},
	year = {2018},
	issn = {0975-8887},
	pages = {1-7},
	numpages = {7},
	url = {http://www.ijcaonline.org/archives/volume181/number4/29701-2018917520},
	doi = {10.5120/ijca2018917520},
	publisher = {Foundation of Computer Science (FCS), NY, USA},
	address = {New York, USA}
}

Abstract

In this paper, we revisit the fundamental question of Bitcoins security against selfish-mine attack introduced by I. Eyal and E. G. Sirer in [5]. We study the state machine of Bitcoin’s network under the influence of one pool miner adopting the selfish mine strategy while the rest of the community following the standard protocol. We prove that the process following by the states of Bitcoin’s system is a irreducible, positive-recurrent, aperiodic, and discrete Markov chain. We give an invariant (stationary) distribution for this Markov chain and deduce easily the rate of convergence towards the stationary equilibrium situation.

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Keywords

Blockchain, Bitcoin, Security, Miners, Attack, Markov chain